Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: A Labour Market Approach by Bouev, Maxim
 
 
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: 
A Labour Market Approach  
 
 
By: Maxim Bouev 
 
William Davidson Working Paper Number 524 
December 2002 Oﬃcial Regulations and the Shadow Economy:
A Labour Market Approach
Maxim Bouev
St.Antony’s College
Oxford OX2 6JF
UK
maxim.bouev@sant.ox.ac.uk
December 1, 2002
Abstract
This work revisits the role of regulations in emergence of the shadow
economy. In particular, it supplements the previous theoretical research
that mainly ignored the fact that the decision to ”go underground” is es-
sentially a result of both employers and employees interacting in the labour
market. We adapt a job search approach (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2001) to
model a transitional economy with an informal sector. We apply and de-
velop the idea ﬁrst documented inter alia by Loayaza (1996) that there
are two types of regulations that inﬂuence the size of the informal labour
market through two diﬀerent channels. Red tape and bureaucratic extor-
tion (bribing) make starting a new business oﬃcially a not very attractive
option and can lead new ﬁrms to the informal sector. On the other hand,
taxes and redundancy pay make oﬃcial ﬁrms oﬀer lower wages which
drives potential employees away into underground jobs. Depending on
various combinations of policy parameters equilibria with diﬀerent share
of the informal economy are possible. The paper draws conclusions regard-
ing the role of unemployment beneﬁts, taxes and formal sector non-wage
beneﬁts in reducing the size of the informal economy. Policy implications
are oﬀered.
Preliminary version
JEL classiﬁcation: H26, J41, J42, J64, O17.
Keywords: informal economy, labour markets, corruption, regulations,
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1Non-technical summary
An increase in the size of informal sectors all over the world has been recently
noticed in a number of studies (Schneider, 2001a,b). Many authors (see, inter alia,
Johnson et al, 2000) have reached an agreement that it is mainly an increasing burden
of taxation, social security contributions and excessive state regulatory activities
combined with labour market restrictions that have heavily contributed to growth of
underground economies. Interestingly, the growth of the informal economy is
accompanied by an increase in the size of underground labour markets. A large body
of previous theoretical research, however, has mainly ignored the fact that the
decision to "go underground" is essentially a result of both employers and employees
interacting in the labour market. In particular, workers while being attracted by
possible tax free unofficial earnings still have a natural tendency to land a formal job
as it can be the only way to become eligible for various social security payments in
case of acquired disability, retirement, etc. The literature generally misses out on this
aspect.
Our work does not let sleeping dogs lie and revisits the role of regulations in
emergence of the shadow economy when the labour market is taken into account. We
adapt a job search approach (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2001) to model a transitional
economy with an informal sector. We apply and develop the idea first documented
inter alia by Loayaza (1996) that there are two types of regulations that influence the
size of the informal labour market through two different channels. Red tape and
bureaucratic extortion (bribing) make starting a new business officially a not very
attractive option and can lead new firms to the informal sector. On the other hand,
taxes and high social security contributions make official firms offer lower wages
which drives potential employees away into underground jobs. This study shows that
in such a situation multiple equilibria with different share of the informal economy
are possible.
The paper analyses the effect of various economic policies (including
unemployment benefits, taxes, formal sector non-wage benefits, etc.) on the size of
the informal economy in different equilibria. Total welfare implications are also
offered. In particular, we show that in decentralised equilibrium the share of the
informal sector is always ineffectively high – so the case is made for reducing the
extent of the informal sector.
The search model developed in the study considers a labour market in the
presence of the informal sector when productivity of formal and informal parts of the
economy is the same, but there are higher barriers to entry into the formal sector. This
model better describes a situation in some Eastern European economies, especially
countries-successors of the former Soviet Union republics. However, one can easily
draw parallels to search models built for OECD countries (e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi,
2001; Fugazza and Jacques, 2002).
The analysis of the model not only supports the widely held opinion,
following from both theoretical and empirical literature (inter alia Loayaza, 1996;
Fortin et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1997; Agénor and Aizenman,1999; Sarte, 2000;
Fugazza and Jacques, 2002; etc.), that higher taxes, corruption, bribery lead potential
employers into the irregular economy, but also it shows that higher unemployment
benefits also push off workers into informal jobs and negatively affect total surplus.We stress the importance of the formal sector non-wage benefits in reducing the scope
of the shadow economy and raising welfare. This parallels to the result of Fugazza
and Jacques (2002), who point out that individual benefits of participating in the
regular sector are more desirable than a deterrence policy to cope with the informal
economy. Our perhaps surprising finding is that such formal regulation as redundancy
pay does not affect the allocation of jobs in the economy as its effect is totally
absorbed by wages in different sectors.
In general we support the idea of Boeri and Garibaldi (2001) that policies
reducing unemployment result in the reduction of the informal sector. However,
contrary to their belief it is shown that in the type of equilibrium where both formal
and informal sectors steadily coexist, the opposite case can be proved true as well:
scaling down the informal sector can lead to a decrease in the level of unemployment.
All in all, this study suggests another view on the emergence of the irregular
sector and supports Fugazza's and Jacques's (2002) argument that informality is an
outcome of non-trivial interactions between various kinds of institutions (fiscal,
labour market, etc.). Only through a thorough understanding of all these interactions a
government can choose an effective way leading to welfare improvements. Reduction
in the size of the informal sector is a general suggestion in the situation this paper is
focused on.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
An increase in the size of informal sectors all over the world has recently been the
focus of a debate in many studies. The situation in OECD countries since 1960
has been analysed by Schneider (2000, 2001) and Schneider and Enste (2000)
who point to the fact that for all countries investigated the informal economy has
reached a remarkably large size. Other authors note that in most transitional
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union the irregular sectors
have been growing over the last decade too (see, e.g., Johnson et al., 1997;
Lackó, 2000). In such countries as Georgia, Russia and Ukraine an increase
in share of the informal sector has been especially notable and it is persistent
character is clearly observed. Interestingly, the growth of the informal economy
is accompanied by an increase in size of underground labour markets (Schneider,
2000, 2001).
Many authors (see, inter alia, Schneider 2000, Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001)
have reached an agreement that it is mainly an increasing burden of taxation,
social security contributions and excessive state regulatory activities combined
with labour market restrictions that have driven up the size and heavily con-
tributed to growth of the underground economies. Tax morale, perceived fair-
ness of the tax system are also mentioned among other causes.
There exists extensive theoretical and empirical literature concentrating on
the eﬀects of regulations on the emergence and development of the informal
sector (inter alia Loayaza, 1996; Fortin et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1997; Agénor
and Aizenman,1999; Friedman at al., 2000; Sarte, 2000; etc.). However, this
large body of previous research has mainly ignored the fact that the decision
to ”go underground” is essentially a result of both employers and employees
interacting in the labour market. Perhaps, the two most notable exceptions
are Boeri and Garibaldi (2001) and Fugazza and Jacques (2002) who invoke
search models to qualify the links between labour market and ﬁscal institutions
and informal activities. Although, these last two studies are undoubtedly of
immense importance for deriving policy implications for such countries as Italy
or Canada, they hardly properly describe the problem faced by employers and
workers in some transitional countries.
Many authors point out that many emerging market economies (especially
countries-successors of the former Soviet Union republics) suﬀer from rent-
seeking and bureaucratic extortion (see, e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Frye
and Zhuravskaya, 1999). At the stage of entry already, potential employers
come across excessive regulations, red tape and corruption. To start a new
ﬁrm, an innovator may have to obtain a great number of business, building,
water and ﬁre permits, tax documents, import licences, etc. As a result, those
entrepreneurs entering the formal sector may well often be forced to pay bribes
to circumvent regulations and speed up the process of enterprise registration
and hiring labour. However, none of existing search models of segmented (for-
mal/informal) labour markets take this aspect into account.
The literature also generally misses out on the importance of non-wage ben-
eﬁts of working in the formal sector. Even when unoﬃcial sector oﬀers higher
2earnings (as, for example, in Russia - see Kolev, 1998), workers still have a nat-
ural tendency to obtain a formal job as it can be the only way to become eligible
for various social security payments in case of acquired disability, retirement,
etc.
This work is aimed at supplementing the theoretical contribution of previous
models with labour market perspective and suggesting welfare optimal policies
for a regulated economy with an informal s e c t o r .W er e v i s i tt h er o l eo fr e g u l a -
tions in emergence of the informal sector and adapt a job search approach (see,
e.g., Acemoglu, 2001) to model interaction of agents in a transitional economy
with features mentioned above. We apply and develop the idea ﬁrst documented
inter alia by Loyaza (1996) that there are two types of regulations that inﬂuence
the size of the informal labour market through two diﬀerent channels. Red tape
and bureaucratic extortion (bribing) make starting a new business oﬃcially a
not very attractive option and can lead new ﬁrms to the informal sector. On
the other hand, taxes and high social security contributions make oﬃcial ﬁrms
oﬀer lower wages which drives potential employees away into underground jobs.
Depending on various combinations of policy parameters equilibria with diﬀer-
ent share of the informal economy are possible. The paper shows that in an
equilibrium, where both formal and informal economies coexist, the share of
the informal sector is always ineﬃciently high. We draw conclusions regarding
the role of unemployment beneﬁts, taxes and formal sector non-wage beneﬁts
in reducing the size of the informal economy.
Although our model has a few similar features with Boeri and Garibaldi
(2001) and Fugazza and Jacques (2002), it is notably diﬀerent by endogenising
wages, introducing entrance costs and formal sector non-wage beneﬁts. Contrary
to the traditional view on the informal sector as a less productive one (e.g.
Agénor and Aizenman,1999; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001), we consider sectors of
equal productivity. It accords well with an important stylised fact left out by
previous theoretical research: in some transitional countries both formal and
informal jobs can often coexist in the same enterprises; workers can receive part
of their salary in black cash - ”under the table”. Finally, our goal is to not
merely suggest policies that can be useful for reducing the size of the informal
sector but also theoretically analyse their welfare implications.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the model,
derives possible equilibria and analyses eﬀects of changes in parameters on the
stable equilibrium when both formal and informal economies co-exist. Section
3 studies welfare implications, while Section 4 draws provisional conclusions.
2 The Model of Informal Employment
2.1 The Main Idea
The model developed in this section aims at capturing the inﬂuence of oﬃcial
regulations on the sectoral reallocation of jobs and workers in an economy with
formal and informal equally productive sectors. The model is inspired by Boeri
3and Garibaldi (2001) and it adapts the approach of Acemoglu (2001) to a case
where ”good” and ”bad” jobs represent two essentially diﬀerent sectors, one of
which is irregular.
The irregular sector is seen as representing productive (not rent-seeking1)
activities that are not associated with crime or household production2 (on mod-
els of crime see Becker, 1968; Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds. 1995; on household
production see Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977). Thus, we take the approach that
views informal employment as resulting from tax evasion and evasion of other
costs attributed to functioning in the formal sector. An important assumption
we make is that goods produced both in formal and informal sectors are perfect
substitutes, while productivity of formal and informal workers is the same. We
do not go along the lines of the prevalent view of the informal economy (see, for
example, Agénor and Aizenman, 1999; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001) that assumes
underground jobs to be less productive and, hence, paying lower wages.
What then makes the diﬀerence between the formal and informal sector in
our model? By assumption all ﬁrms producing oﬃcially have to abide by a set
of rules and regulations implying additional costs to them. On the other hand,
functioning informally does not involve those expenses. Jobs are not declared
in order to avoid costs of functioning openly. Although such concealment of
production is possible it is anyway prosecuted by oﬃcials. Each hiding ﬁrm faces
some positive probability of being caught and closed as a result of government
monitoring or audit.
We consider two types of rules and regulations that can have an impact on
the eventual result of the reallocation of jobs and the workforce.
First, it is costs of vacancy posting in the formal sector. Opening a vacancy in
either sector obviously implies some costs and can be time-consuming. However,
in the formal sector registration of an enterprise/job can in fact be rather a slow
business because of red tape and bureaucracy. If, in addition, the bureaucracy
is corrupt the process can deliberately be slowed down in order to extort bribes
from potential entrepreneurs wishing to get their businesses running quickly
(see, e.g., Safavian et al, 2001). On the other hand, posting a vacancy in the
informal sector can mean lower costs, for example involving only advertisement.
Thus, newly established ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ: they can either bear a higher
cost (involving, e.g., paying bribes) and start functioning in the formal sector,
or they can choose informal aﬃliation instead and pay a lower start-up price.3
1Acemoglu (1995) and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) study the allocation of talent between
productive and rent-seeking activities. Vostroknoutova (2002) extends their models to include
an underground sector.
2In the literature on informal activities it is normal to distinguish between household
activities, informal sector, irregular sector and criminal sector (see, for example, Thomas,
1992). While the idea behind home production and criminal activities should be obvious, one
might become confused over the diﬀerence between informal and irregular sectors. Usually it
is small workshops and self-employment which are regarded as the informal sector. It can also
comprise home production that is traded in the market. All these activities are not illegal.
The sector that we consider in this model is indeed irregular, which comprises production of
legal output, but involves tax evasion and avoidance of formal regulations. However, we will
use both terms ”irregular” and ”informal” interchangeably.
3In contrast to Boeri and Garibaldi (2001) all new jobs in the economy are not necessarily
4In the latter case they might be closed as soon as the tax police or similar
authority gets to know about their shadow activities.
The second type of regulations that we attach a special importance in the
model is taxes and ﬁxed costs of closing a job in the formal sector (this idea
is similar to Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001). It is assumed that according to the
oﬃcial legislation all ﬁrms supplying jobs in the formal sector have to provide
some redundancy pay to their workers in case of job closure or liquidation.
In principle, the amount of this payment can be seen as a function of wages.
However, for keeping things simple in this paper we focus on some lump sum
redundancy pay. In the informal sector ﬁrms are free to shut their businesses
and ﬁre their workers without any severance pay.
Workers in the model can either work formally or informally or be unem-
ployed. We neglect possibilities of moonlighting, so workers can perform only
one activity at a time. Aggregate labour supply is inelastic.
The economy is assumed to have free entry in each sector, so zero proﬁt
conditions and preferences of workers determine equilibrium allocation of jobs
and workers in the economy in steady state. As formal and informal goods are
perfect substitutes this may result in multiple equilibria (see Acemoglu, 2001)
where not only one type of jobs exists but both formal and informal jobs coexist.
Here we present a basic model where all policy parameters are exogenous.
We introduce a government later in Section 3.
2.2 Matching Technology
If there is no on-the-job search it is only the unemployed workers who look
for jobs. We assume that search is undirected4, and both formal and informal
vacancies have the same probability of meeting workers. Then it is the total
number of vacancies that enters the matching function.
The number of job matches is given by M(n,v),w h e r en is the number of
workers seeking jobs (i.e. the number of unemployed) and v is the number of
vacancies created in the economy.
With constant returns to matching, the instantaneous probability that a
vacant informal job meets a job-seeker is given by
M(n,v)
v
= M(
n
v
,1) = q(θ),
where θ ≡ v
n.
The ﬁrst derivative of the ﬂow rate of match for a vacancy, q0(θ), is negative,
because the greater is the value of θ t h em o r ed i ﬃcult for ﬁrms it becomes to
ﬁll the job. In the matching literature θ is referred to as market tightness from
the ﬁrms standpoint (see, for example, Pissarides, 2000).
Similarly, the ﬂow rate of match for an unemployed worker is given by
formal.
4For a good model of directed search in the presence of the informal sector see Fugazza
and Jacques (2002).
5M(n,v)
n
= M(1,
v
n
)=α(θ)=θq(θ),
where α0(θ) > 0.
When q(θ) and α(θ) < ∞ then matching is not instantaneous and takes
some time.
We will also make the additional Inada-type assumptions that
limθ→∞q(θ)=0 , limθ→0q(θ)=∞, limθ→∞α(θ)=∞,a n dlimθ→0α(θ)=0 .
2.3 Formal and Informal Jobs
Jobs can be created in either the formal or informal sector. One job is one
employee. As constant returns to matching are assumed we do not necessarily
deﬁne one job as one ﬁrm. Before opening a vacancy a ﬁrm has to decide in
which sector the potential match will produce and, at this point, will have to
bear some costs. These costs are either kf or ki,i ft h eﬁrm decides to open
a vacancy in the formal economy or underground, respectively. These start-up
costs are incurred before the ﬁrm meets its employees5 and can be thought of as
job advertisement costs as well as a registration fee or bribes needed to prevent
a hold-up of registration in the formal sector.6 We assume that entrepreneurs
are wealthy and can meet start-up costs without resorting to external credit,
etc.
All matches in the economy, either formal or informal, die at rate δ.W h e n
it happens the job is destroyed while the worker becomes unemployed. As a
match dies an employer in the formal sector has to provide its employee with
a lump sum redundancy pay, which equals R.I n f o r m a le m p l o y e r s ,h o w e v e r ,d o
not pay anything to workers they sack or make redundant.
Both formal and informal jobs are equally productive. Wages are paid out
of the match product, y. In addition to wages, formal jobs have to pay a lump
sum tax, τ, whereas informal jobs enjoy tax evasion.
In the model it is implicitly assumed that there are some taxation authorities,
e.g. tax police, whose aim is to collect taxes and reveal cases of tax evasion.
So, there is an exogenous ﬂow probability m that an employer gets caught in
engaging in underground business and ﬁned by the amount F.W h e nm strikes
the informal match is liquidated and the burden of ﬁne is borne by the employer,
not the employee.7
5This assumption is reinterpretation of the creation costs in Acemoglu (2001). There a
ﬁrm incurs diﬀerent costs by investing in diﬀerent equipment before meeting its workers.
6Sarte (2000) builds an edogenous growth model with entry regulated by bureaucrats.
7Safavian et al. (2001) note that, in fact, tax police visits of ﬁrms are closely linked to cor-
ruption as well - regulatory inspections are positively correlated with amount of bribes payed.
Interestingly, tax authorities can often change regulation without notifying entrepreneurs and
then pay them a visit to obtain a ﬁne or extorting a bribe for regulation avoidance. Evi-
dence suggests, however, that, e.g. in Russia, ﬁrms with higher reservation proﬁts (i.e., e.g.,
revenues allowing them functioning just without making losses) are less likely to be charged
excessive bribe payments and, hence, less likely to be checked by monitoring bodies. Thus, in
6Finally, free entry is assumed both into formal and informal sectors, so ﬁrms’
proﬁts have to be equal to zero in equilibrium.
Thus, the Bellman equation8 for a formal job is
rJf = y − wf − τ + δ(0 − Jf − R) (1)
where r is the ﬂow rate of return on having the job ﬁlled (interest or discount
rate), Jf is the value of the ﬁlled formal job to the employer, and wf is the
formal wage. The equation reads that the return to the ﬁrm on a ﬁlled job in
the formal sector is equal to the diﬀerence between worker’s productivity and
costs, plus a potential change in value in case of the match break-up.9 We shall
assume very generally that the productivity of a match, y, is high enough to
pay wages, taxes and other costs.10
For an informal job we have
rJi = y − wi + m(0 − Ji − F)+δ(0 − Ji), (2)
where Ji is the value of the ﬁlled informal job and wi is the informal wage. The
equation implies that the return on a ﬁlled job in the informal sector is equal
to the diﬀerence between the product of the match and worker’s wage, plus a
potential change in value in the case of being caught by tax authorities, plus a
change in value due to the match cessation.
It is assumed that vacancy maintenance in either formal or irregular sector
involves no ﬂow costs.11 Then the Bellman equations for vacancies in formal
and informal sectors are:
rVf = q(θ)(Jf − Vf), (3)
rVi = q(θ)(Ji − Vi), (4)
where q(θ) is the ﬂow rate of ﬁlling a vacancy as deﬁned above.
our model the absence of monitoring and ﬁnes in the formal sector can be explained not only
b yt h en a t u r eo fo ﬃcial functioning, but it can also be interpreted in the light of Safavian
et al (2001) results: higher kf implies higher reservation revenues in the formal sector, and,
hence, the assumption of the absence of costs resulting from being monitored is reasonable.
8Hereafter we focus only on steady state values of the Bellman equations since the purpose
of the paper is to analyse long-run policies that should reduce the size of the irregular sector.
Out of steady states each Bellman equation in the paper should be augmented to include a
ﬁrst time derivative of an appropriate value function.
9We ignore a possibility of voluntary quits of workers, in which case the march breaks up
as well but the employer does not pay a redundancy allowance.
10For more exact conditions see subsection 2.6.1.
11Neither in this paper do we focus on costs of maintaining vacancy aﬃliated with possible
extortion of rents by illegal elements. This racket threat is equally likely for formal and
informal ﬁrms in practice (Frye and Zhuravskaya, 1999).
7Free entry into the economy implies that it should not be possible for an ad-
ditional vacancy in either sector to open and make expected net proﬁts. Hence,
Vf = kf (5)
Vi = ki (6)
That is, the condition of zero proﬁts implies that start-up costs equal to kf
and ki in formal and informal sectors, respectively, must be just recouped in
equilibrium. The important assumption we make is that kf >k i, i.e. the
presence of extortion costs at the moment of entry in the formal sector implies
higher instant start-up costs. We shall specify more concretely the relationship
between the two in section 2.6.3.
2.4 Workers
There is a ﬁxed number of workers in the economy. They can be either employed
in one of the sectors or unemployed.
Formal employment gives workers a monetary income, wf,a n di ti sa l s o
associated with some non-wage beneﬁts bf. The latter can be seen either as
fringe beneﬁts available in formal ﬁrms (in this case the beneﬁts are not linked
anyhow to productivity of a match) or as a ﬂow value of future pensions, for
which workers qualify while working in the formal sector.12 For simplicity, here
we assume perfect substitutability between wages and the beneﬁts.
Then the Bellman equation for formal workers looks like
rEf = wf + bf + δ(Eu − Ef + R).13 (7)
It reads that the return on formal employment is equal to the wage income
plus non-wage beneﬁts plus a change in unemployment in case of the match
break-up. The latter brings the worker redundancy remuneration R.
Informal employment brings in wage wi, but does not provide any beneﬁts
akin to those in the formal sector:
rEi = wi +( δ + m)(Eu − Ei). (8)
That is, the return on informal employment is equal to the wage income plus
a potential change into unemployment as a result of either the match cessation
or job closure due to tax evasion detected by the authorities.
12Also, following the tradition of literature on informal economies (e.g. Loayaza, 1996;
Johnson at al., 1997) one can interprete bf as some public good access to which is only
possible through oﬃcial employment.
13We neglect the impact of income taxes on the value of being employed in formal sector
(on unimportance of taxes for sector choice see, e.g., Lemieux et al., 1994).
8Finally, the Bellman equation for unemployed is
rEu = bu + α(θ)(φ(Ef − Eu)+( 1− φ)(Ei − Eu)) (9)
where bu is the unemployment beneﬁt, φ is the probability of meeting a formal
vacancy, 0 <φ<1,a n dα(θ) is the ﬂow rate of ﬁnding a job in either sector.
The equation says that the return on being unemployed equals unemployment
compensation plus a potential change into employment in one of the sectors.
2.5 Wages
Wages in the model are determined through a wage bargaining process with the
bargaining power of workers, β, given exogenously and such that 0 <β<1.
Then the celebrated Nash (1950) bargaining solution implies:
(1 − β)(Ef − Eu)=β (Jf − Vf), (10)
(1 − β)(Ei − Eu)=β (Ji − Vi). (11)
It should be noted that the Nash solution in this case assumes that the
threat (reservation) points for employers and employees are represented by the
value of unﬁlled vacancy in an appropriate sector and the value of unemploy-
ment, respectively. This implies that bargaining actually takes place before the
consummation of a match, but after a producer has opened a vacancy. Thus,
ﬁrms are assumed to commit to wages over which the consensus was reached:
they cannot change the contract once a worker gets employed.14
2.6 Steady State Equilibria
An equilibrium in the model is characterised by the labour market tightness, θ,
a probability of ﬁnding a formal job, φ, and by value functions Jf, Ji, Vf, Vi, Ef,
Ei,a n dEu, such that equations (1)-(11) are all simultaneously satisﬁed. As we
assumed undirected search, in steady state both formal and informal vacancies
meet workers at the same rate and both types of jobs are accepted.
Acemoglu (2001) shows that in a similar model under assumptions of perfect
substitutability of formal and informal goods, multiple equilibria are possible.
Following the similar lines of analysis we show here that it can be possible in
our model too.
14This speciﬁcation of bargaining can lead to ineﬃciencies of equilibrium. If it is assumed
that ﬁrms are risk neutral in our economy, then the ﬂat wage proﬁles, to which ﬁrms commit
during bargaining are not optimal. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) point out that in such a
case an optimal strategy would be to oﬀer large signing bonuses and then hold workers to
their reservation wages. This would let risk-neutral ﬁrms bear optimally the risk of future
random separations resulting in our model from job cessation and the governmental audit of
informal employers.
92.6.1 Zero proﬁt conditions
Solving (1) and (2) for Jf and Ji we arrive at
Jf =
y − wf − τ − δR
π
, (12)
Ji =
y − wi − mF
ρ
, (13)
where π = r + δ and ρ = r + δ + m are the eﬀective discount rates in formal
and informal sectors, respectively.
Substituting these solutions together with conditions (5) and (6) for (10)
and (11), and combining the results with equations (7) and (8), simple algebra
gives
wf = βSf +( 1− β)rEu − (bf + δR), (14)
wi = βSi +( 1− β)rEu, (15)
where Sf = y + bf − τ − kfπ and Si = y − mF − kiρ -a r et o t a lﬂow surpluses
of a match in the formal and informal economies, respectively. These equations
imply that the worker gets share β of the surplus of a match plus (1−β) times his
outside option. In the case of formal employment the worker’s wage is corrected
for non-wage beneﬁts, bf, and probable redundancy payment, R.
Having obtained expressions for wf and wi, by using equations (12) and
(13) together with (3), (4), we can deﬁne two proﬁt functions for the formal and
informal sector respectively:
Πf (θ,φ)=Vf − kf = q(θ)
(1 − β)(y + bf − τ − rEu(θ,φ))
π(r + q (θ)(1− β))
− kf, (16)
Πi (θ,φ)=Vi − ki = q (θ)
(1 − β)(y − mF − rEu(θ,φ))
ρ(r + q (θ)(1− β))
− ki. (17)
Then the zero proﬁt conditions (5) and (6) can be reexpressed as Πf (θ,φ)=0
and Πi (θ,φ)=0 , or
q (θ)
(1 − β)(y + bf − τ − rEu(θ,φ))
π(r + q(θ)(1− β))
= kf, (18)
10q(θ)
(1 − β)(y − mF − rEu(θ,φ))
ρ(r + q (θ)(1− β))
= ki.15 (19)
Each of the equations (18) and (19) deﬁnes θ as a function of φ and pa-
rameters of the model, kf,k i,β,r,δ,b f,b u,τ,m,F. To close the circle we need
to analyse properties of Eu(θ,φ).
2.6.2 The value of being unemployed
The value of being unemployed follows from (9) and equals
Eu(θ,φ)=
buπρ+ α(θ)β (φρSf +( 1− φ)πSi)
r(α(θ)β((1 − φ)π + φρ)+πρ)
. (20)
For the function Eu(θ,φ) it can easily be veriﬁed that it is continuous and
bounded by
£bu
r ,max 1
r (Sf,S i)
¤
. Also, it is strictly increasing in θ provided that
y and bf are big enough.16 The intuition behind this result is straightforward:
the value of being unemployed is increasing in market tightness, as it becomes
easier to ﬁnd a job. In contrast, without additional assumptions about the
parameters of the model Eu(θ,φ) cannot be shown to be increasing or decreasing
in φ everywhere. The sign of the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ hinges upon the relative
value of employment in formal and informal sectors, Ef and Ei, respectively.
In particular, whenever Ef is greater than Ei,
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ is positive, and negative
otherwise. This result implies that the value of being unemployed rises whenever
does the proportion of vacancies posted in the sector, the value of employment
in which is higher.
Various combinations of model’s parameters deﬁne a relative value of Ef and
Ei. It turns out, however, that two eﬀects are of central importance here. First,
it is the eﬀect of relative match duration in a particular sector, and, second,
the eﬀect of the relative size of the surplus in the same sector compared to the
other sector. Thus, considering ratios of the two eﬀective discount rates,
ρ
π,
and relative values of surpluses in the two sectors less unemployment beneﬁts,
Sf−bu
Si−bu , is enough to describe cases when Ef >E i and Ef <E i. In Fig.1 we
15Alternatively, we can reexpress the two zero proﬁt conditions using the notation for match
surpluses introduced above:
q (θ)
(1−β)(Sf−rEu)
π = rkf,
and
q (θ)
(1−β)(Si−rEu)
ρ = rki.
16In particular, to guarantee
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂θ > 0 we must reasonably claim that at least y +bf >
τ +kfπ+bu, i.e. the product of a match, y, plus the public good, bf, are at least as large as to
pay all the ﬂow costs of functioning in the formal sector and the wage equal to the reservation
value, bu. This condition implies that Ef >E u holds. Analogously, to insure Ei >E u, we
must guarantee y>m F+ kiρ + bu. Otherwise, whenever any of these conditions is not met,
an appropriate sector simply does not exist.
11put
Sf−bu
Si−bu on the horizontal axis and measure
ρ
π on the vertical axis. The
ﬁgure demonstrates three regions that we shall concentrate on in the further
analysis.17
In region 1 in Fig.1 the formal sector surplus is greater than its informal
counterpart, i.e.,
Sf−bu
Si−bu > 1, and the ratio of the two eﬀective discount rates,
ρ
π,
is greater than the inverse of the ratio of two surpluses (shown by a downward
sloping curve in the ﬁgure). The latter constraint is not binding, though, but
what matters is that in this region the formal sector provides higher income
to workers and employers than the informal sector does. At the same time
the duration of a formal match is longer than that of the informal match: by
assumption the formal discount rate is not higher than its counterpart in the
informal sector, π ≤ ρ. These combinations of parameters unambiguously imply
that Ef >E i and, thus,
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0.
The inverse combination of parameters deﬁnes region 3 in Fig.1. Now it is
the informal sector that allows workers and employers enjoy a higher surplus,
i.e.
Sf−bu
Si−bu < 1. The informal income thus generated is so big that its eﬀect on
matching agents is not even counterbalanced by the fact that the eﬀective dis-
count rate in the informal sector is still higher than in the formal one: although
ρ
π > 1, in this region the ratio is lower than the inverse of the ratio of the two
surpluses,
ρ
π < Si−bu
Sf−bu. T h u s ,h e r ew ec l e a r l yh a v eEf <E i, while
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ < 0.
Finally, in region 2, on the one hand, the informal sector oﬀers a higher
surplus,
Sf−bu
Si−bu < 1, but, on the other hand, its eﬀect may be counterbalanced
by a higher eﬀective discount rate in the irregular economy:
ρ
π > Si−bu
Sf−bu. This
implies that both cases Ef >E i and Ef <E i, and hence
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0 and
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ < 0, are possible depending on which factor has a greater inﬂuence on
agents in the economy.
Proposition 1 There exists some threshold value of the market tightness θ, de-
ﬁned by the parameters kf,k i,β,r,δ,b f,b u,τ,m,F,and parameters of the match-
ing function, such that for parameter values satisfying conditions in region 2,
Fig.1, and for any θ>θ the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ is negative, and for any θ<θ
it is positive.
The proof of the proposition above is relegated to Appendix A.
The two eﬀects of relative match duration and the relative size of two sur-
pluses considered above prove to be very important not only for the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ , but also for the type of equilibrium that results in the model. We
elaborate on this importance in the subsection that follows.
2.6.3 Finding equilibria
If there exists an equilibrium with both formal and informal jobs then both
formal and informal proﬁts must be equal to zero at the equilibrium point.
17Note, by assumption of the model ρ ≥ π and, thus, all possible cases are conﬁned to the
shaded area in Fig.1.
12That is, the equations (18) and (19) are simultaneously satisﬁed. Alternatively,
there can exist equilibria with only one type of jobs. In that case, proﬁts in one
of the sectors would be negative and only one of the equations (18) and (19)
would hold.
Two loci The two zero proﬁt conditions (18) and (19) deﬁne two loci of formal
and informal jobs in (θ,φ)-plane. Both must be evaluated with the expression
for Eu(θ,φ) (20) substituted in.
By using simple algebra and invoking the implicit function theorem it can
easily be veriﬁed that the locus of formal jobs (18) has a slope
∂θ
∂φ
|f =
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ
∂q(θ)
∂θ
kfπ
q2(θ)(1−β) −
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂θ
. (21)
Since
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂θ is always positive, whereas
∂q(θ)
∂θ < 0,i ti so b v i o u st h a tt h e
denominator is negative. Then the slope of the locus of formal jobs has a sign
opposite the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ .
Analogously, the slope of the locus of informal jobs (19) in (θ,φ)-plane is
∂θ
∂φ
|i =
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ
∂q(θ)
∂θ
kiρ
q2(θ)(1−β) −
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂θ
, (22)
which, again, by the same token, has a sign opposite the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ .
Remark 2 Both the locus of formal jobs (18) and the locus of informal jobs
(19) have slopes of the same sign.
For diﬀerent combinations of parameters represented by regions 1-3 in Fig.1,
the two loci will be either positively or negatively sloped. We consider this issue
further in the next subsection.
If the two loci intersect at some θ
∗ and 0 <φ
∗ < 1, then the pair (θ
∗,φ
∗) is
an interior equilibrium. Otherwise, only corner equilibria of the types (∗,0) or
(∗,1) are possible.
Existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibria When analysing the
sign of the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ above, we rested the discussion of possible cases
on relation between the ratio of the two eﬀective discount rates,
ρ
π, and the
surpluses in two sectors, Si−bu
Sf−bu. As
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ determines slopes of the two loci
deﬁned in the preceding subsection, the relative eﬀects of match duration in a
particular sector,
ρ
π, a n do ft h es u r p l u ss i z ei nt h e r e , Si−bu
Sf−bu, directly aﬀect the
type of equilibrium outcome, and particularly the resulting value of equilibrium
market tightness. But what happens to be central to the problem of existence
13and stability of equilibrium is the relative eﬀect of ﬂow value of start up costs,
ρki
πkf compared to the relative eﬀect of the surplus size, Si−bu
Sf−bu. If the two eﬀects
complement each other the model generates either a unique equilibrium with
formal jobs only or an equilibrium with informal jobs only. If the two eﬀects
are counterbalancing an interior equilibrium with both types of jobs becomes
possible.
Fig.2 shows six non-overlapping regions A-F, each of which corresponds to
various combinations of parameters and represents a particular equilibrium type.
To bear a resemblance to Fig.1, we measure
ρ
π on the vertical axis and
Sf−bu
Si−bu
on the horizontal axis, and show the inverse relation, Si−bu
Sf−bu, as a dashed curve.
Above the latter is the solid curve
kf
ki
Si−bu
Sf−bu. This is obtained from the inverse
ratio of the two surpluses, Si−bu
Sf−bu, by multiplying it by the ratio of the start-up
costs in two sectors,
kf
ki , which is always greater or equal to 1 by assumption.
The curve
kf
ki
Si−bu
Sf−bu, as well as straight lines
kf
ki =1and
Sf−bu
Si−bu =1(or, equiva-
lently Sf = Si), deﬁne boundaries of regions A-F. It turns out that an interior
equilibrium does exist in two regions A and D, while under parameters’ values
satisfying restrictions corresponding to regions B, C, E, and F in Fig.2 the two
loci do not intersect. There the resulting equilibrium will consist of one type
of jobs only. Now we can move on to discussing uniqueness and stability of
equilibria in each of the regions A-F.
Region A. In region A in Fig.2
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0 so that expressions (21) and
(22) are negative, and both loci are downward sloping. Restrictions on parame-
ter values in this region imply that the formal sector surplus is greater than its
informal counterpart,
Sf−bu
Si−bu > 1, while the ratio of ﬂow values of start-up costs
is lower than the inverse ratio of surpluses,
ρki
πkf < Si−bu
Sf−bu. This implies that,
on the one hand, the formal sector attracts employers and employees by big
potential income resulting from a higher value of the formal surplus, but, on the
other hand, employers shrink from opening too many vacancies formally as they
face higher ﬂow value of entry costs, πkf, to recoup later on. In this situation,
it is easy to verify that the locus of formal jobs (18) and the locus of informal
jobs (19) have an intersection point for some 0 <φ
∗ < 1 and, that the former
locus is ﬂatter than the latter locus in some neighbourhood of that intersection
point. So the locus of formal jobs crosses the locus of informal jobs from below,
as shown in Fig.3. Given that
∂Πf(θ,φ)
∂θ |Πf(θ,φ)=0 < 0 and
∂Πi(θ,φ)
∂θ |Πi(θ,φ)=0 < 0
(see Appendix A for proof), i.e. proﬁts both in formal and informal sectors
decrease in market tightness along the appropriate loci18, the interior equilib-
rium is not stable in this case. At the same time there exist two other stable
equilibria where only one of the sectors exists.
Region B. In region B the surplus in the informal sector is greater than
the surplus in the formal sector,
Sf−bu
Si−bu < 1, while ﬂow values of the entry costs
are still such that ρki <π k f. That is, workers and employers not only get
higher surplus if match informally, but the latter need to recoup lower start-up
18These conditions hold for all the cases in the model.
14expenses if operate underground. In this region the locus of informal jobs lies
above the locus of formal jobs and the resulting equilibrium with informal jobs
alone is stable (Fig.4).
Region C. The situation corresponding to region C is similar to that in
region B. However, in region C ρki >π k f, i.e. the ﬂow value of informal entry
costs is higher than that of the formal entry costs. At the same time, this
negative news for informal employers is more than compensated by the higher
surplus that informal matches bring in:
ρki
πkf < Si−bu
Sf−bu. So, again the result is a
stable equilibrium without formal jobs (Fig.4).19
Regions E and F. These two regions mirror the cases for regions B and C
just considered. There, however, only an equilibrium with formal jobs results
(Fig.5) as not only the formal sector surplus is greater than its informal coun-
terpart,
Sf−bu
Si−bu > 1, but also the ratio of ﬂow values of entry costs is such that
ρki
πkf > Si−bu
Sf−bu. The latter inequality implies that the relation between ﬂow values
of start-up costs never compensates the diﬀerence between surpluses in the two
sectors. It can be the case that ρki >π k f (region E), or ρki <π k f (region F),
but the eﬀect of the greater formal surplus always prevails on employers and
workers to match formally.
Region D. Finally, in region D in Fig.2 restrictions on parameters suggest
that the formal surplus is smaller than the informal surplus,
Sf−bu
Si−bu < 1, while
the ratio of ﬂow values of entry costs is greater than the inverse ratio of surpluses,
ρki
πkf > Si−bu
Sf−bu. This implies that, on the one hand, the irregular sector is more
appealing to employers and workers due to higher potential income, but, on the
other hand, employers hold back from opening vacancies informally as they face
ah i g h e rﬂow value of start-up costs, ρki, to regain after entry.20 By analogy with
the case of region A, it is easy to verify that the locus of formal jobs (18) and the
locus of informal jobs (19) have an intersection point for some 0 <φ
∗ < 1, i.e.
an interior equilibrium with both types of jobs exists. For parameter values in
region D the formal jobs locus is steeper than its informal counterpart in some
neighbourhood of an interior equilibrium (θ
∗,φ
∗). In this region
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ can be
either negative or positive, as region D in Fig.2 is a subarea of region 2 in Fig.1.
19In both regions B and C depending on the values of parameters the economy can be either
above or below the dashed curve in Fig.2. Then, the sign of
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ can either be positive
or negative, and, hence, both loci of formal and informal jobs can be either negatively or
positively sloped. However, it does not change the essence of the result: the informal locus
lies above the formal one, i.e. when formal jobs just break even, informal matches make
positive proﬁts. Fig.4 corresponds to the situation when
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0.
20Another way to see the trade oﬀ faced by employers in this region is to expand expressions
for surpluses and analyse the resulting combination of parameters. So, e.g.
Sf−bu
Si−bu < 1 is
equivalent to Sf −Si = bf −τ −πkf +mF +ρki < 0. Since πkf <ρ k i in this region, we must
have τ − bf >m F .This implies that the negative eﬀect of the tax rate net of formal sector
non-wage beneﬁts confronted by employers in the oﬃcial part of the economy overweighs the
eﬀect of governmental audit of the informal jobs, mF. So, employers are tempted to run
business informally. At the same time, the audit is still intensive enough to make the ﬂow
value of informal sector entry costs higher than its formal counterpart (remember, ρ = π+m).
This squeezes informal proﬁts and holds back informal employers.
15From proposition 1 we know that the sign of the derivative is negative for any
θ>θ,a n dp o s i t i v ef o ra n yθ<θ,w h e r eθ is some threshold value of the market
tightness. Then for θ>θ the two loci will both be positively sloped, whereas
for θ<θ they will be downward sloping.
Proposition 3 Let θ be a threshold value of market tightness such that
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ =
0 and (θ
∗,φ
∗) be a point of an interior equilibrium in region D, Fig.2. Then θ
∗
is always less than θ.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Proposition 3 implies that if the two loci of formal and informal jobs intersect
and an interior equilibrium results we can conﬁne ourselves to the situation with
a less tight labour market, i.e. θ<θ. Then
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0,t h et w ol o c ih a v e
negative slopes and the formal jobs locus crosses the informal jobs locus from
above: the resulting equilibrium is unique and stable (Fig.6).
2.6.4 Summing up
In this section we have found conditions for existence of equilibria of diﬀerent
types. The analysis above, in fact, implies that whenever
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ > 0, i.e. the
value of being employed in the formal sector, Ef, is greater than the value of
being informally employed, Ei, there always exists an equilibrium with formal
jobs (regions A,D,E and F in Fig.2). At the same time there can exist equilibria
with a positive proportion of informal vacancies (regions A and D). Otherwise,
when
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ < 0, workers prefer irregular employment more and the only
equilibrium with informal jobs results (regions B and C in Fig.2).
We have also shown that in cases when an interior equilibrium exists two
eﬀects balance each other. The ﬁrst eﬀect is the impact of surplus in a particular
sector. For example, in region A, Fig.2., Sf >S i. This makes informal work not
attractive for employers and workers. The second eﬀect is the impact of upfront
costs that employers have to pay before opening a vacancy. So, in the same
region,
ρki
πkf < Si−bu
Sf−bu or πkf >ρ k i. This implies that potential entrants into the
formal sector should be prepare to get back higher start-up costs, and this has
a negative eﬀect on attractiveness of the formal sector. Thus, the equilibrium
with formal and informal sectors results as a balance of two eﬀects. The similar
reasoning is applied to analysis of the equilibrium in region D, Fig.2.
In all other regions represented in Fig.2 both eﬀects just discussed either act
in the same direction, or one never compensates another, which brings around
an equilibrium with one type of jobs only.
Even when the interior equilibrium exists it can be unstable, which takes
place for parameter values satisfying region A, Fig.2. By contrast, in region D
the equilibrium is stable.
All in all, this analysis implies that the equilibrium proportion of formal
jobs reﬂects relative costs and gains for workers and employers of functioning in
the formal sector. Thus, it supports Loayaza (1996) and Kaufmann (1997) who
16pointed out that the ratio of reported to unreported activities depends largely
on the costs and beneﬁts of operating in each economy.
In the next section we further develop the investigation to look closely at
how changes in various parameters aﬀect the equilibrium allocation of jobs and
vacancies.
2.7 Changes in Parameters: an Impact on Job Allocation
Now that we have established equilibrium properties of the model and discussed
what they mean, we can examine how changes in parameter values aﬀect the
equilibrium outcome. We choose the case represented in Fig.6 as a basis for
further analysis and as a starting point for our economy. It is obvious that
this case is also the most interesting one for the purpose of our work. There
in the stable equilibrium both formal and informal sectors co-exist, and a part
of the economy is hidden from the view of oﬃcial authorities. In other cases
represented in Fig.3, 4, and 5 either only one of the sectors exists in equilibrium
or the equilibrium where both sectors are present is unstable.
The equilibrium allocation of jobs in our economy depends on a number of
parameters such as taxes, unemployment beneﬁts, entry costs, etc. If one or a
few of these parameters vary the equilibrium in Fig.6 shifts to a new position.
It is important to remember that many of these parameters are, in eﬀect, policy
tools in the hands of government. So, the government can often achieve a
desirable allocation of jobs simply by changing a value of one of the parameters.
Here we consider eﬀects of such changes for each parameter in turn, holding
other parameters of the model constant.
2.7.1 Monitoring and ﬁnes for engagement in informal activity
Monitoring of ﬁrms and ﬁnes for engagement in the informal business are the
costs of operating in the informal sector. Suppose, ﬁrst, the government decides
to subsidise monitoring authorities (e.g. tax police) more generously, which
r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nm - the variable, describing the probability that an
employer gets caught working in underground business. Such a rise in m leads,
ﬁrstly, to a decrease of the informal surplus relative to the formal surplus, and,
secondly, to an increase in the rate of death of the informal matches. The former
eﬀect has a negative impact on the proﬁtability of underground jobs, whereas
the latter has a positive externality eﬀect: since underground ﬁrms die faster,
it becomes easier to ﬁll in vacancies for remaining shadow businesses. It is easy
to verify that the overall eﬀect of an increase in m brings about an increase
in the share of formal vacancies, φ, as well as reduces the equilibrium value of
the market tightness, θ. Apart from that, it can also be shown that not only
the proportion of formal vacancies increases, but the total number of formal
jobs also rises, while the total number of informal jobs decreases. Moreover, the
latter eﬀect is outweighed by the former so that unemployment decreases.
A further and greater increase in m can dramatically reduce the informal
surplus and bring the underground sector to a halt. Such a situation will cor-
17respond to a shift from region D to region E in Fig.2, where the only possible
equilibrium consists of formal jobs alone.
Instead of investing more in monitoring authorities in an attempt to shackle
the shadow sector, the government may simply increase punishment for involve-
ment in underground business. In our model, this would imply a rise in F.
The eﬀect of higher F is somewhat similar to that of an increase in m, with
the exception of that the former does not aﬀect the eﬀective discount rate in the
informal sector, ρ, and, thus, does not create a positive externality on informal
ﬁrms competing for workers. An increase in F shifts the locus of formal ﬁrms
(18) up, whereas the informal jobs locus (19) then moves down. This results
in an unambiguous decrease in θ, while φ rises (Fig.7). The number of formal
jobs increases, while the number of informal jobs drops. Unemployment is also
reduced. Again, a further and greater increase in F would result in a collapse
of the informal sector and bring the economy in region E in Fig.2.
2.7.2 Taxes
Empirical literature has suggested that taxes levied in the formal sector are
one of the possible reasons that drives potential employers underground as they
represent one of the costs of legal production (see e.g. Johnson et al., 2000).
In our model an increase in the value of lump sum taxes on formal employers,
τ, reduces the formal sector surplus and results in locus’s of formal jobs (18)
shifting down in (θ,φ)-plane, while the locus of informal jobs (19) shifts up.
This implies that the equilibrium value of θ rises, whereas the equilibrium value
of φ decreases (Fig.8). The number of formal jobs decreases, and the number of
informal jobs rises, together with the number of unemployed.
By reasoning similar to one in the case with monitoring and ﬁnes, a substan-
tial increase in taxes may toss the economy across from region D to region C in
Fig.2 where the only stable equilibrium is the one with informal jobs alone.
2.7.3 Unemployment beneﬁts
Contrary to taxes, ﬁnes and monitoring, unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect neither
formal surplus Sf nor informal surplus Si. However, they still are very crucial
for intersectoral job allocation.
An increase in bu makes both loci (18) and (19) shift down. It is straight-
forward to verify that
dφ
dbu < 0, while dθ
dbu =0by totally diﬀerentiating (18) and
(19) with respect to θ, φ and bu, and then solving the system of resulting equa-
tions in a stable equilibrium for
dφ
dbu and dθ
dbu. This result implies that in eﬀect
for a given θ both loci shift by the same distance, i.e. the equilibrium proportion
of formal jobs, φ, decreases, whereas the equilibrium value of market tightness,
θ, does not change. Thus, the introduction of more generous unemployment
beneﬁts leads to crowding out of formal vacancies by informal ones. This can
be explained by the fact, that higher beneﬁts raise the reservation value of work-
ers, who can now aﬀord to wait longer for jobs with higher pay in the informal
sector and accept them more eagerly, even though they are more risky in terms
18of shorter average duration. The result also obtains that the number of formal
jobs drops whereas both the number of informal jobs and unemployment rise.
Again, too large an increase in unemployment beneﬁts would ﬂip the economy
into the region C in Fig.2. with an equilibrium as in Fig.4.
2.7.4 Non-wage beneﬁts and redundancy pay in the formal sector
One of distinctive features of our model is that we explicitly consider non-wage
beneﬁts received by formally employed workers. A change in bf makes the
formal sector more or less attractive and aﬀects the equilibrium outcome.
An increase in bf, for example, will force the locus of formal jobs to shift up,
as it will raise the surplus obtained in the formal sector. On the other hand,
the locus of informal jobs will move down, as the equilibrium value of G(θ,φ)
increases. This results in a drop in θ and a rise in φ (Fig.7). Also the number of
formal jobs rises and the number of informal jobs drops, whereas unemployment
is reduced. In general, the non-wage beneﬁts that can be thought of as either
some public good provided to formally employed, or a discounted value of future
pensions, are a useful instrument of bringing workers and employers back from
the shadow sector. The eventual result of a substantial increase in bf can lead
the economy to end up in region E in Fig.2, where there are no informal jobs in
equilibrium.
Unlike non-wage beneﬁts in the formal sector, the redundancy pay parame-
ter, R,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the equilibrium composition of jobs, and thus any changes
in it will not have any eﬀect on job allocation across sectors. This is explained
by impacts of R on the value of a ﬁlled job in the formal sector, Jf, and the
formal wage, wf, that cancel out each other, so that the resulting value of a for-
mal job, Jf, does not change at all. The only visible outcome of, for example,
an increase in redundancy pay, R, is a deepening in the gap between formal and
informal wages (see (14)).
2.7.5 Other institutional changes
Apart from parameters representing primary policy instruments, the allocation
of jobs across sectors in the model depends on relative entry costs,
kf
ki , and
the bargaining power of workers, β. These parameters reﬂect the institutional
environment in the economy: spreading corruption and bribery, for example,
increases
kf
ki , while strengthening in a position of trade unions raises β.
Consider, for example, a decrease in kf, which corresponds to less bribing and
extortion in the formal sector. This can possibly be achieved by restructuring
the bureaucracy and by better enforcement of laws cracking down on corruption.
With such a decrease in kf the locus of formal jobs moves up, while the locus
of informal jobs shifts down. The outcome is a drop in the equilibrium value of
θ, a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee q u i l i b r i u mv a l u eo fφ (Fig.7). The number of formal
jobs rises, whereas the number of informal jobs decreases along with the level of
unemployment. On the other hand, an upsurge in corruption and rent-seeking
19i nt h ee c o n o m yw o u l dr e s u l ti na ni n c r e a s ei nkf, and hence in a rise in both
unemployment and the proportion of informal vacancies and jobs.
Institutional changes leading to an increase in the bargaining power of work-
ers, β, shift both loci of formal and informal jobs down, so that the eﬀect on θ
and φ is ambiguous. However, under certain assumptions, in particular when
matching function exhibits constant returns, and the Hosios (1990) eﬃciency
condition is met, it is possible to show that θ drops whereas φ does not change
as a result of a rise in β. At the same time both numbers of formal and informal
jobs decrease, while the unemployment rate rises.
2.7.6 Results summary and notes on policies
T a b l e1s u m m a r i s e st h ee ﬀects of parameter changes considered above.
Table 1.
An increase in Eﬀect on
φθNIU
m +-+- -
F +-+- -
τ -+-+ +
bu -0-+ +
bf +-+- -
β 0---+
kf -+-+ +
R 00000
By N, I and U we denote numbers of ﬁlled formal and informal jobs, and
the number of the unemployed, respectively.
I tc a nb es e e nt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nm, F, bf, and/or a decrease in τ,kf and bu
reduce the share of the informal sector in the economy when measured both by
the proportion of its vacancies in the total number of vacancies and by the ratio
of ﬁlled informal jobs to ﬁlled formal jobs. A few provisional policy implications
follow from here.
First, these results support the idea that taxes may cause businesses to
ﬂee into the shadow economy, and that a higher tax burden is associated with
a higher share of the informal sector (see Johnson et al., 2000). To increase
the number of formal jobs and vacancies governments should unambiguously
decrease taxes, should it ﬁnd the economy in a situation corresponding to Fig.6.
Second, widespread corruption, rent-seeking and bribery in an economy
would also force potential employers out into underground, as can readily be
seen by increasing kf.T h i sﬁnding accords well with empirical studies in East-
ern Europe (e.g., Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et al, 2000). Thus, curbing
corruption and bribery pays by prompting employers away from the informal
sector. This result is very much in line with theoretical work by Murphy et al.
(1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Sarte (2000), as well as it supports ﬁndings
of a more recent study by Vostroknoutova (2002).
Third, the analysis suggests that providing non-wage beneﬁts to those for-
mally employed is very important unless one wishes to see more matches created
20informally. Lavish formal sector beneﬁts, bf, make it much more attractive to
potential employees to work oﬃcially and escape engagement in underground
activities.
Fourth, our results suggest that an increase in the size of the informal sector
may come out of policies aimed to make unemployment compensation more gen-
erous. This ﬁnding is similar to Boeri’s (1999) observation that overly generous
non-employment beneﬁts at the outset of transition in some countries of Eastern
Europe favoured a drive to non-employment, which in his model in eﬀect implies
employment in the informal sector. The crucial diﬀerence between his and our
work is that in Boeri’s model an increase in wages as a repercussion of higher
unemployment beneﬁts does not aﬀect the decision of employers to take oﬀ in
the informal economy: it is only the non-employed, who prefer draw beneﬁts
a n do nt h et o po ft h a t ,e n j o yi n f o r m a la ctivities. By contrast, in our model,
an increase in beneﬁts aﬀects relative sizes of surpluses in each sector, and thus
also has a direct eﬀect on the proportion of employers posting vacancies in the
informal market.
Fifth, Table 1 suggests that better monitoring and higher ﬁnes for working
informally are, perhaps, the most straightforward way to shackle the informal
economy, while additional labour market regulations such as redundancy pay in
the formal ﬁrms should not be of great concern for policy makers taking stock
of the size and extents of the shadow sector.
Finally, it is easy to notice that all the policy measures cutting down the
size of the informal sector at the same time reduce unemployment. Thus, this
model makes out a case for arguing that not only policies aimed at reducing
unemployment pay oﬀ by scaling down the shadow sector (Boeri and Garibaldi,
2001), but also direct policies aimed at reducing the size of the latter (such as
an increase in monitoring intensity, m,o rﬁnes, F) bring about a higher level of
employment in the economy. This ﬁnding contradicts a conclusion of Boeri and
Garibaldi (2001), who say that any attempts to reduce shadow employment will
result in higher unemployment. We explain this by the fact that any increase in
the proportion of formal vacancies accompanied by an increase in the number
of ﬁlled formal jobs results in a greater number of workers staying employed (as
duration of jobs in the formal sector is higher), while unemployment becomes
less signiﬁcant.
Having known the eﬀects of changes in parameters one might raise a question
about purposefulness of conducting policies aimed at reducing the share of the
informal sector in the economy. In general, it is possible to think of a number of
reasons why governments may be interested in increasing the number of oﬃcial
ﬁrms. Shleifer and Vishny (1998), for example, suggest that such reasons may
emanate from properly organised ﬁscal systems, politicians’ desire to win greater
support for elections, direct ﬁnancial interests of politicians (shareholding). On
the other hand, a benevolent government interested in raising economic welfare
would strive to scale down the informal economy if a greater shadow sector
reduces welfare of economic agents.
In the discussion above we did not touch welfare implications, namely, which
of the equilibrium outcomes is more socially optimal. Now we move on to reﬂect
21on eﬃciency issues of the mixed equilibrium and consider possible restrictions
on certain policies.
3 Implications for Welfare
3.1 Total Surplus
In analysing the welfare properties of equilibrium, we will follow Acemoglu
(2001) and Hosios (1990), and consider the total steady-state surplus of the
economy. We deﬁne it as total surplus in both sectors minus costs. This mea-
sure is similar to net output of the economy, i.e. what Acemoglu (2001) calls
the measure that an agent would care before entering the economy. However,
in our case it is not precisely the net outp u ta st h es u r p l u si nt h ef o r m a ls e c t o r
includes non-wage beneﬁts bf, which are received by formal workers but do not
result from productivity of a match.
Let us write down the total surplus in steady state as
Ξ(θ,φ)=NSf + ISi − θU(φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki)+Ubu. (23)
This surplus is equal to total ﬂow surplus in both sectors, which consists of the
number of workers in formal jobs, N =( 1− U)φ δ+m
δ+mφ, times the formal sector
surplus, Sf = y + bf − τ − kfπ, plus the number of workers in informal jobs,
I =( 1− U)(1− φ) δ
δ+mφ, times the informal surplus, Si = y−mF −kiρ, minus
the ﬂow costs of job creation for formal and informal vacancies (respectively,
θUφπkf and θU(1−φ)ρki), plus total ﬂow beneﬁts received by the unemployed,
Ubu.21 Notice that the proportion of formal vacancies among all vacancies, φ,
and proportion of ﬁlled formal jobs among all ﬁlled jobs, φ δ+m
δ+mφ, do not coincide
due to diﬀerent job duration rates in diﬀerent sectors. Also, it can be shown
that U =
δ(m+δ)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ) (see Appendix A for derivation of these results),
the stock of unemployed workers in steady state, is in fact a function of θ and
φ.
Suppose now that there is another agent in our economy, namely a benev-
olent government.22 Such a government would, for example, be committed to
maximising (23) subject to the net tax revenue constraint:
τN + mFI − buU − bfN = Ω. (24)
The equation (24) reads that the net tax revenue consists of taxes collected from
formal jobs, τN,p l u sﬁnes collected from informal jobs, mFI, less unemploy-
ment beneﬁts paid to the jobless, buU, less non-wage beneﬁts provided in the
formal sector, bfN. This net tax revenue has to equal some value Ω.
21See footnote 3 in Hosios (1990) for the derivation of this formula for analysing the con-
strained Pareto eﬃciency in search models.
22Notice, however, we still implicitly assume that at a lower level government oﬃcials are
corrupt, and prompt higher costs of opening a formal vacancy, kf.
22Allocations of jobs delivering maximum to (23) subject to (24) and con-
straints on U(θ,φ) are (constrained) Pareto eﬃcient. In general, the problem
of Pareto ranking equilibria shown in Fig.3-6 seems to be insoluble without
further assumptions about parameters of the model. It is likely that the same
value of the total surplus may be achieved in diﬀerent equilibria depending on
the resulting equilibrium value of the market tightness. However, we can try
to answer the question about what the government should do, given that it
starts in a situation when the economy is already in region D, Fig.2 (i.e. when
both formal and informal economies are stably present), and what would be an
eﬃcient outcome for such a government.
3.2 Ineﬃciency of Mixed Equilibrium
By substituting (24) into (23) the government problem is reduced to maximisa-
tion of
Ξr (θ,φ)=N (y − πkf)+I (y − ρki) − θU(φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki) − Ω. (25)
In mixed equilibrium πkf <ρ k i, by assumption, so an increase in the number
of ﬁlled formal jobs, N, accompanied by an equivalent or smaller decrease in
the number of informal jobs, I, would increase the value of (25). Also, if in
addition, the proportion of formal vacancies, φ, increases, while the value of the
market tightness, θ, decreases, the value of (25) rises even more, as it leads to
ad e c r e a s ei nt h ev a l u eo ft h et h i r dt e r mi nt h es u ma b o v e( s e eA p p e n d i xAf o r
proof).
Proposition 4 If the government starts in region D in Fig.2, in order to raise
the level of welfare in the economy it should conduct such policies as to increase
the number of formal jobs, N, not as much decrease the number of informal jobs,
I, raise the proportion of formal vacancies, φ, and reduce the market tightness,
θ, provided that the net tax revenue amounts to Ω.
Thus, any policy producing such a result would move the economy to a more
eﬃcient position.
Proposition 5 Each of the policies considered in Table 1 and resulting in a
reduction in size of the informal sector increase the value of the total surplus.
The formal proofs of these results are given in Appendix A. Here we just
note that if the equilibrium allocation of jobs across sectors is eﬃcient, partial
derivatives of (25) with respect to parameters of the model must be equal to
zero when evaluated in the interior equilibrium shown in Fig.5. However, given
πkf <ρ k i it is always the case that ∂Ξr
∂bu < 0, ∂Ξr
∂bf > 0, ∂Ξr
∂m > 0, ∂Ξr
∂F > 0,
∂Ξr
∂τ < 0, ∂Ξr
∂β < 0, and ∂Ξr
∂kf < 0, whenever parameters of the model satisfy
conditions for the mixed equilibrium, in particular, τ − bf >m F .Thus by
raising m, F, bf, and/or decreasing τ, kf and bu the value of reduced total
surplus can always be increased.
23Corollary 6 The mixed equilibrium is not eﬃcient: the government always
has a possibility to improve on welfare in the economy by choosing among policy
measures suggested in Table 1.
Starting oﬀ at the mixed equilibrium (Fig.6) the government can lead the
economy to end up either in no shadow equilibrium (Fig.5) or shadow sector
equilibrium (Fig.4). In the former case, the total welfare will increase, in the
latter case it will decrease. This suggests another corollary.
Corollary 7 Given πkf <ρ k i, the most eﬃcient result for the economy would
be an equilibrium with formal jobs only.
3.3 Further Notes on Policies
Although, policies for improving on eﬃciency are galore, not all of them can be
carried out together at the same time. For example, an increase in the formal
sector beneﬁts, bf, raising economic welfare, would likely require an increase in
taxes, τ, leading to a decrease in welfare. This can happen because we assumed
a constraint on the net tax revenue. But even in the case when an increase in
welfare is, in principle, feasible - for example, the government can simultaneously
reduce taxes and unemployment beneﬁts so that the net tax revenue is still equal
to Ω, - other constraints may limit the degree to which welfare can be raised. So,
there can exist some subsistence level b, below which unemployment beneﬁts,
bu, just cannot be brought. Thus the problem of the government looks very
challenging indeed, while our model anyway suggests simple policy tools and
avenues to explore for policymakers.
First, as we have just noted, unemployment beneﬁt sm a yp l a ya ni m p o r t a n t
role in raising economic welfare. It has already been shown by Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999a) in a search set-up with risk averse workers that unemployment
beneﬁts may improve distribution of resources and restore the economy to the
output maximising allocation. Other studies by Diamond (1981), Marimon
and Zilibotti (1999) and Acemoglu (2001) have also pointed out an eﬃciency
increasing role of unemployment insurance in search models with risk neutrality.
In our model, however, it is the less generous unemployment insurance that
has a positive eﬀect on total welfare. Providing more lavish unemployment
compensation just gets the jobless more interested in informal jobs with higher
pay. Hence, it leads to an increase in the number of informal matches, which
has a negative eﬀect on total welfare.
Second, increasing monitoring of informal jobs and ﬁnes for running shadow
businesses probably represents the most direct way to cut down the size of the
informal sector and increase welfare. However, in reality it could well not be
easy to fulﬁll because of a number of reasons left out by our model. To start
with, an increase in monitoring intensity is likely to imply better ﬁnancing of
corresponding authorities, i.e. it prompts additional governmental expenses.
Thus, again, governments may be constrained by their budgets, and an intensi-
ﬁed audit is likely to require heavier taxation. Instead, governments may wish
24to opt more decidedly for an increase in ﬁnes to do away with the informal
sector. However, an increase in ﬁnes’ size must be credible, i.e. such ﬁnes must
be credibly levied and collected to take eﬀect. In practice, however, tax and
monitoring authorities may be corrupt and trade higher oﬃcial ﬁnes for bribes,
smaller in size, which go directly to tax inspectors, but not to the state (Safa-
vian et al., 2001). Chander and Wilde (1992), for example, point out that if
auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the ﬁne rate or the tax rate
to reduce expected government revenue. So, the size of levied ﬁnes can also be
constrained in reality.
The suggestion pointing to the possibility of corruption among government
oﬃcials (in addition to that generating higher entry barriers in the formal sector,
considered in our model) reminds one that in practice governments often happen
to be of a ”grabbing hand” type in terminology of Shleifer and Vishny (1998),
rather than of a ”helping hand” type. The former will pursue purposes very
diﬀerent from those of maximising total welfare, which is an alleged objective
of the latter type. Such a corrupt government, both likely to come across in
despotic and democratic states, may well be interested, for example, in creating
conditions for rent-seeking and bribery to ﬂourish. In such a case, politicians
would, for example, aim to increase possibilities for bribe-taking. In terms of
parameters of our model, this implies that such a government would not only
seek to maximise income originating from formal employers’ having to pay high
entrance costs kf, but it may well also avoid shackling the informal sector by
intense monitoring and large ﬁnes, as the mere existence of informal employers
creates richer opportunities for bribe taking whenever informal producers get
caught and face the real possibility of being closed.23
The natural implication of the analysis by Shleifer and Vishny (1998) is that
the less the government of a grabbing hand type the better oﬀ the economy in
terms of welfare. Within the limits of our model, the welfare unambiguously
improves as kf lowers. That is, putting it diﬀerently, whenever the government
seeks ways to combat corruption and bribery preventing entrepreneurs easy
access to the formal sector the better oﬀ the economy.
To sum up, we have shown that policies aimed at reducing the share of the
informal sector in the economy, are welfare improving in the case of a mixed
equilibrium (Fig.6), which is, thus, ineﬃcient. However, in practice governments
are limited by various constraints and often resort to a mixture of policies. The
overall welfare eﬀect is diﬃcult to predict, in this case. Nevertheless, we sug-
gest that governments concentrating on anti-corruption measures and avoiding
overburdening formal employers with taxes are likely to bring workers and en-
trepreneurs in the formal sector and improve their welfare.
23De Soto (1989) notes that many permits, licenses and regulations exist ptobably to give
oﬃcials the power to deny them and to collect bribes in return for providing the permits. By
the same token, the grabbing hand government will not try to weed out the shadow sector
completely as detection of informal employers creates new opportunities for bribe-taking.
254C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this study we developed a model of search in the labour market in the presence
of the informal sector when productivity of formal and informal parts of the
economy is the same, but there are higher barriers to entry into the formal sector.
This model better describes a situation in some Eastern European economies,
especially countries-successors of the former Soviet Union republics. However,
one can easily draw parallels to search models built for OECD countries (e.g.
Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001; Fugazza and Jacques, 2002).
It was shown that under diﬀerent values of parameters diﬀerent equilibria
can result from interaction of employers and jobseekers. In only one case the
outcome is a stable equilibrium where the formal sector co-exists with the infor-
mal one. That equilibrium is characterised by suﬃciently high taxes compared
to low formal sector beneﬁts and monitoring intensity of the informal sector.
The eﬀect of the latter on the potential irregular producers, however, is still
signiﬁcant enough at the entry stage to outweigh the eﬀect of additional entry
costs paid in the formal sector due to corruption. In section 3.2 we prove that
such an equilibrium is not eﬃcient and the governments should look for ways
to weed out the informal sector and increase the number of formal jobs in the
economy in order to improve total welfare.
The model supports the widely held opinion, following from both theoretical
and empirical literature (inter alia Loayaza, 1996; Fortin et al., 1997; Johnson et
al., 1997; Agénor and Aizenman,1999; Sarte, 2000; Fugazza and Jacques, 2002;
etc.), that higher taxes, corruption, bribery lead potential employers into the
irregular economy. In addition, we show that higher unemployment beneﬁts also
push oﬀ workers into informal jobs and negatively aﬀect total surplus. We stress
the importance of the formal sector non-wage beneﬁts in reducing the scope of
the shadow economy and raising welfare. This parallels to the result of Fugazza
and Jacques (2002), who point out that individual beneﬁts of participating in
the regular sector are more desirable than a deterrence policy to cope with the
informal economy. Perhaps, a surprising ﬁnding is that such formal regulation
as redundancy pay does not aﬀect the allocation of jobs in the economy as its
eﬀect is totally absorbed by wages in diﬀerent sectors.
In general we support the idea of Boeri and Garibaldi (2001) that policies
reducing unemployment result in the reduction of the informal sector. However,
contrary to their belief it was shown that in the type of equilibrium we considered
the opposite can be true as well: scaling down the informal sector can lead to a
decrease in the level of unemployment.
All in all, this study suggests another view on the emergence of the irregular
sector and supports Fugazza’s and Jacques’s (2002) argument that informality is
an outcome of non-trivial interactions between various kinds of institutions (ﬁs-
cal, labour market, etc.). Only through a thorough understanding of all these
interactions a government can choose an eﬀective way leading to welfare im-
provements. Reduction in the size of the informal sector is a general suggestion
in the situation we focused on.
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29AP r o o f s
Proposition 1. There exists some threshold value of the market tightness
θ, deﬁned by the parameters kf,k i,β,r,δ,b f,b u,τ,m,F,and parameters of the
matching function, such that for parameter values satisfying conditions in region
2, Fig.1, and for any θ>θ the derivative
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ is negative, and for any θ<θ
it is positive.
Proof:
By deﬁnition Eu(θ,φ,·)=
buπρ+α(θ)β(φρSf+(1−φ)πSi)
r(α(θ)β((1−φ)π+φρ)+πρ) .
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂θ =
∂α(θ)
∂θ βπρ
φρ(y+bf−τ−kfπ−bu)+(1−φ)π(y−mF−kiρ−bu)
r(α(θ)β((1−φ)π+φρ)+πρ)2 > 0
as y + bf − τ − kfπ − bu > 0 and y − mF − kiρ − bu > 0 by assumption.
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ =
= α(θ)βπρ
ρ(y+bf−τ−kfπ−bu)−π(y−mF−kiρ−bu)+α(θ)β(bf+mF−τ−kfπ+kiρ)
r(α(θ)β((1−φ)π+φρ)+πρ)2 =
= α(θ)βπρ
ρ(Sf−bu)−π(Si−bu)+α(θ)β(Sf−Si)
r(α(θ)β((1−φ)π+φρ)+πρ)2
The restrictions on parameter values in region 2, Fig.1 imply
Sf−bu
Si−bu < 1 and
ρ
π > Si−bu
Sf−bu.
Hence, Sf − Si < 0 and ρ(Sf − bu) − π(Si − bu) > 0.
Thus,
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ > 0 if ρ(Sf − bu) − π(Si − bu) > −α(θ)β(Sf − Si) and
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ < 0 if ρ(Sf − bu) − π(Si − bu) < −α(θ)β(Sf − Si).
Or, alternatively,
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ > 0 if α(θ) < −
ρ(Sf−bu)−π(Si−bu)
β(Sf−Si) and
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ < 0 if α(θ) > −
ρ(Sf−bu)−π(Si−bu)
β(Sf−Si) .
Deﬁne θ as θ = α−1
³
−
ρ(Sf−bu)−π(Si−bu)
β(Sf−Si)
´
, then by properties of function
α(θ) we have
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ > 0 if θ<θ and
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂φ < 0 if θ>θ.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3. Let θ be a threshold value of market tightness such that
∂Eu(θ,φ)
∂φ =0and (θ
∗,φ
∗) be a point of an interior equilibrium in region D, Fig.2.
Then θ
∗ is always less than θ.
Proof:
From Proposition 1 it follows that α
¡
θ
¢
= −
ρ(Sf−bu)−π(Si−bu)
β(Sf−Si) > 0.
At the point of an interior equilibrium both zero proﬁt conditions hold, i.e.
q(θ
∗)
(1−β)(y+bf−τ−rEu(θ∗,φ∗,·))
π(r+q(θ∗)(1−β)) = kf, and
q(θ
∗)
(1−β)(y−mF−rEu(θ∗,φ∗,·))
ρ(r+q(θ∗)(1−β)) = ki,
or
q(θ
∗)=
kfrπ
(1−β)(y+bf−τ−kfπ−rEu(θ∗,φ∗,·)), and
q(θ
∗)=
kirρ
(1−β)(y−mF−kiρ−rEu(θ∗,φ∗,·)).
Then equating the two ratios we get
kfrπ
(y+bf−τ−kfπ−rEu(θ∗,φ∗,·)) =
kirρ
(y−mF−kiρ−rEu(θ∗,φ∗,·))) or
Eu(θ
∗,φ
∗,·)=
kfπ(y−mF)−kiρ(y+bf−τ)
r(kfπ−kiρ) =
kfπ(y−mF)−kiρ(y+bf−τ)
r(kfπ−kiρ)
30Substituting the expression for Eu(θ
∗,φ
∗,·) we get
buπρ+α(θ∗)β(φ∗ρSf+(1−φ∗)πSi)
r(α(θ∗)β((1−φ∗)π+φ∗ρ)+πρ) =
kfπ(y−mF)−kiρ(y+bf−τ)
r(kfπ−kiρ) .
Solving it for α(θ
∗) yields
α(θ
∗)=
kiρ(Sf−bu)−kfπ(Si−bu)
β(Si−Sf)(kfφ∗+ki(1−φ∗)) > 0.
Now we can compare α(θ
∗) and α
¡
θ
¢
.
So, we have:
α
¡
θ
¢
=
ρ(Sf−bu)−π(Si−bu)
β(Si−Sf) and α(θ
∗)=
kiρ(Sf−bu)−kfπ(Si−bu)
β(Si−Sf)(kfφ∗+ki(1−φ∗)) =>
α
¡
θ
¢
>α(θ
∗) as kf >k i and ρ>πby assumption, which implies θ>θ
∗
given properties of α(·).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4. If the government starts in region D in Fig.2, in order to
raise the level of welfare in the economy it should conduct such policies as to
increase the number of formal jobs, N, not as much decrease the number of
informal jobs, I, raise the proportion of formal vacancies, φ, and reduce the
market tightness, θ, provided that the net tax revenue amounts to Ω.
Proof:
Consider the function
Ξ(θ,φ,·)=N (y − kfπ)+I (y − kiρ) − θU (φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki) − Ω
1) In region D, Fig.2, we have kfπ<k iρ, so (y − kfπ) > (y − kiρ). Thus,
whenever N rises, while I proportionally decreases Ξ(θ,φ,·) rises as well.
2) Now, let U be U =
δ(m+δ)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ) (see below derivation of this for-
mula).
For the function
θU (θ,φ,·)=
θδ(δ+m)
δ(δ+m)+α(θ)(δ+mφ) = δ
δ
θ+
α(θ)
θ
(δ+mφ)
(δ+m)
= δ
δ
θ+q(θ)
(δ+mφ)
(δ+m)
we have
∂
∂θ (θU (θ,φ,·)) = ∂
∂θ
µ
δ
δ
θ+q(θ)
(δ+mφ)
(δ+m)
¶
> 0
and
∂
∂φ (θU (θ,φ,·)) = ∂
∂φ
µ
δ
δ
θ+q(θ)
(δ+mφ)
(δ+m)
¶
< 0
Thus, whenever φ ↑, while θ ↓, the value of θU(θ,φ,·) decreases.
3) Finally, whenever φ ↑ the sum (φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki) decreases as kfπ<
kiρ.
All three results together prove the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5. Each of the policies considered in Table 1 and resulting in
a reduction in size of the informal sector increase the value of the total surplus.
Sketch of the proof:
We consider a case of an increase in non-wage beneﬁts, bf (the cases of other
parameters can be proved by analogy).
It is easy to verify that for such an increase we will have:
dθ∗
dbf =
q2(θ∗)(1−β)
∂q(θ∗)
∂θ r(kiρ−kfπ) < 0 and
31dφ∗
dbf =
kiρ
µ
1−r
∂E(θ∗,φ∗,·)
∂bf
¶
+kfπr
∂E(θ∗,φ∗,·)
∂bf
(kiρ−kfπ)r
∂E(θ∗,φ∗,·)
∂φ
−
q2(θ∗)(1−β)
∂E(θ∗,φ∗,·)
∂θ
∂q(θ∗)
∂θ r(kiρ−kfπ)
∂E(θ∗,φ∗,·)
∂φ
> 0,
where
∂E(θ∗,φ∗,·)
∂bf =
α(θ∗)βφ∗ρ
r(α(θ∗)β((1−φ∗)π+φ∗ρ)+πρ) > 0 and all other terms as
before.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ee ﬀects on stocks at the equilibrium point are given by
∂N(·)
∂bf =
=
δ(m+δ)
(δ(m+δ)+α(θ∗)(mφ∗+δ))2∗
∗
³
α(θ
∗)(m + δ + α(θ
∗))
∂φ∗
∂bf +
∂α(θ
∗)
∂θ
∂θ∗
∂bf φ
∗ (m + δ)
´
> 0;
∂I(·)
∂bf =
=
δ(m+δ)
(δ(m+δ)+α(θ∗)(mφ∗+δ))2∗
∗
³
−α(θ
∗)(δ + α(θ
∗))
∂φ∗
∂bf +
∂α(θ∗)
∂θ
∂θ∗
∂bf (1 − φ
∗)δ
´
< 0;
∂U(·)
∂bf =
= −
δ(m+δ)
(δ(m+δ)+α(θ∗)(mφ∗+δ))2
³
α(θ
∗)m
∂φ∗
∂bf +
∂α(θ
∗)
∂θ
∂θ∗
∂bf (mφ
∗ + δ)
´
< 0;
where
N (·)=
α(θ)φ(m+δ)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ),
I (·)=
δα(θ)(1−φ)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ),
U (·)=
δ(m+δ)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ) (see below).
Now consider the derivative of the reduced total surplus with respect to bf
at the equilibrium point:
∂Ξr
∂bf = ∂N
∂bf (y − kfπ)+ ∂I
∂bf (y − kiρ) − ∂
∂bf (θU (φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki)) =
= ∂N
∂bf (y − kfπ)+ ∂I
∂bf (y − kiρ)
−(φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki) ∂
∂bf (θU) − (θU) ∂
∂bf (φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki)=
= ∂N
∂bf (y − kfπ)+ ∂I
∂bf (y − kiρ)
−(φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki)
³
∂θ
∂bf U + ∂U
∂bf θ
´
− (θU)
∂φ
∂bf (πkf − ρki)
As we have
∂N(·)
∂bf > 0, while
∂I(·)
∂bf < 0 and
∂U(·)
∂bf < 0, this implies that
¯ ¯ ¯
∂N(·)
∂bf
¯ ¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯ ¯
∂I(·)
∂bf
¯ ¯ ¯.
(By assumption N + I + U =1-s e eb e l o w ) .
Then ∂N
∂bf (y − kfπ)+ ∂I
∂bf (y − kiρ) > 0.
From above we have ∂θ
∂bf < 0 and ∂U
∂bf < 0, while
dφ∗
dbf > 0 and πkf <ρ k i, so
that
−(φπkf +( 1− φ)ρki)
³
∂θ
∂bf U + ∂U
∂bf θ
´
− (θU)
∂φ
∂bf (πkf − ρki) > 0.
Thus, bringing pieces together, ∂Ξr
∂bf is always positive at the equilibrium
point. So by increasing bf we can increase both the proportion of formal va-
cancies,
dφ∗
dbf > 0, and the number of ﬁlled formal jobs, ∂N
∂bf > 0, and the total
surplus ∂Ξr
∂bf > 0, provided that the constraint on the government budget is met.
Q.E.D.
32Proofs of other results
I. Derivatives of the proﬁt functions
∂Πf(θ,φ,·)
∂θ |Πf(θ,φ,·)=0 < 0 and
∂Πi(θ,φ,·)
∂θ |Πi(θ,φ,·)=0 < 0
Proof:
Formal proﬁts are: Πf(θ,φ,·)=q (θ)
(1−β)(y+bf−τ−rEu(θ,φ,·))
(r+q(θ)(1−β))π − kf
Πf(θ,φ,·)=0is equivalent to (y + bf − τ − rEu(θ,φ,·)) =
kfπ(r+q(θ)(1−β))
q(θ)(1−β)
Then for the ﬁrst zero proﬁt condition we have:
∂Πf(θ,φ,·)
∂θ |Πf(θ,φ,·)=0 =
= r(1 − β)
∂q(θ)
∂θ (y+bf−τ−rEu(θ,φ,·))−q(θ)
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂θ (r+q(θ)(1−β))
(r+q(θ)(1−β))2π |Πf(θ,φ,·)=0 =
=
∂q(θ)
∂θ rkfπ−
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂θ rq2(θ)(1−β)
q(θ)(r+q(θ)(1−β))π
So, given
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂θ > 0 and
∂q(θ)
∂θ < 0 we have
∂Πf(θ,φ,·)
∂θ |Πf(θ,φ,·)=0 < 0.
Informal proﬁts are: Πi(θ,φ,·)=q (θ)
(1−β)(y−mF−rEu(θ,φ,·))
(r+q(θ)(1−β))ρ − ki
The second zero proﬁt condition is Πi(θ,φ,·)=0 , which is equivalent to
(y − mF − rEu(θ,φ,·)) =
kiρ(r+q(θ)(1−β))
q(θ)(1−β)
∂Πi(θ,φ,·)
∂θ |Πi(θ,φ,·)=0 =
= r(1 − β)
∂q(θ)
∂θ (y−mF−rEu(θ,φ,·))−q(θ)
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂θ (r+q(θ)(1−β))
(r+q(θ)(1−β))2ρ |Πi(θ,φ,·)=0 =
=
∂q(θ)
∂θ rkiρ−
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂θ rq2(θ)(1−β)
q(θ)(r+q(θ)(1−β))ρ
So, again given
∂Eu(θ,φ,·)
∂θ > 0 and
∂q(θ)
∂θ < 0 we have
∂Πi(θ,φ,·)
∂θ |Πi(θ,φ,·)=0 < 0.
Q.E.D.
II. Derivation of expressions for stocks and proportions of ﬁlled
jobs at steady states
From Bellman equations, stocks at steady state must satisfy:
δN = α(θ)φU
(δ + m)I = α(θ)(1 − φ)U
α(θ)U = δN +( δ + m)I
I + N + U =1
Solution of this system is:
U =
δ(m+δ)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ),I=
δα(θ)(1−φ)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ), and N =
α(θ)φ(δ+m)
δ(m+δ)+α(θ)(mφ+δ).
Thus, the proportion of formal jobs in total number of jobs is given by:
N
N+I =
α(θ)φU
δ
α(θ)φU
δ +
α(θ)(1−φ)U
(δ+m)
= φ δ+m
δ+φm;
and, analogously, the proportion of informal jobs in total number of vacancies
is
I
N+I =
α(θ)(1−φ)U
(δ+m)
α(θ)φU
δ +
α(θ)(1−φ)U
(δ+m)
=( 1− φ) δ
δ+φm.
Q.E.D.
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